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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
            
 
No. 95-5033 
            
 
W.B., Parent of the Minor, E.J., on her 
own behalf and on behalf of her son, E.J., 
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
JOAN MATULA; MARY ANGELA ENGELHARDT; JUDY BEACH; 
CATHERINE BRENNAN; PATRICIA CERICOLA; DR. GARY DANIELSON; 
ANN PEARCE; KATHLEEN MAHONY; CAROL BURNS; 
FLORENCE NOCTOR; DR. JEFFREY OSOWSKI; NEW JERSEY STATE 
BOARD OF EDUCATION; WARREN COUNTY DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION; MARY LOU VARLEY; MANSFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION; 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY; DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DIVISION OF 
SPECIAL EDUCATION; EMPLOYEES OF THE MANSFIELD TOWNSHIP 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 
 
            
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 93-3124) 
 
            
 
Argued August 22, 1995 
 
BEFORE:  GREENBERG, COWEN, and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed October 17, l995) 
            
 
 
       Rebecca K. Spar (argued) 
       Cole, Schotz, Meisel, Forman 
        & Leonard, P.A. 
       25 Main Street, 4th Floor 
       Hackensack, NJ  07601 
 
       Attorney for Appellant 
 
 
       David A. Wallace (argued) 
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       942 Route 517 
       P.O. Box 741 
       Hackettstown, NJ  07840 
 
       Attorney for Appellees 
 
 
            
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 Plaintiff, on behalf of her disabled child, seeks damages 
for the persistent refusal of certain school officials to 
evaluate, classify and provide necessary educational services.  
The matter was dismissed by the district court on the grounds 
that a settlement of the administrative proceeding barred pursuit 
of the claims for damages.  We conclude that the settlement 
agreement was not susceptible to summary disposition.  Indeed, we 
question the propriety of demanding and receiving a release of 
such claims in exchange for providing services to which a 
disabled child is otherwise entitled.  However, since the 
settlement agreement did not clearly waive such claims, we do not 
determine whether such a waiver would be against public policy.  
We do conclude that the agreement does not bar such claims as a 
matter of law, and therefore reverse and remand the matter for 
trial. 
 Plaintiff brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act against school officials, alleging 
that the child was deprived of his right to a free, appropriate 
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public education, in violation of the U.S. and New Jersey 
Constitutions and federal and state statutes and regulations.  
Despite resistance by school officials and following extensive 
administrative proceedings, the mother ultimately succeeded in 
having her child evaluated, classified as neurologically impaired 
and provided with special education services.  Plaintiffs then 
sued for compensatory and punitive damages incurred in the period 
before the school agreed to provide these services.  The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all 
claims predicated upon a settlement of the administrative 
proceeding.  We will affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate 
in part. 
 
I. 
 Plaintiff W.B. and her minor child, plaintiff E.J., moved to 
Hackettstown, New Jersey during the summer of 1991.  W.B.'s 
requests for special educational services for E.J., defendants' 
alleged resistance to these requests, and the damages arising 
from this alleged resistance, occurred while E.J. was in the 
first and second grades.  We will recount these events in some 
detail.  While some of the facts may be in dispute, most are not, 
and in any event, in view of the procedural posture of the case, 
we recite the facts from the viewpoint of the plaintiffs. 
 Before the start of school in the fall of 1991, W.B. met 
with defendant Joan Matula, principal of the Mansfield Township 
Elementary School ("the school"), to discuss her concerns about 
E.J.'s behavioral problems, including touching and hitting other 
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children.  W.B. also completed forms at the school in which she 
stated that E.J. had received speech therapy. 
 E.J. entered the first grade in September 1991 and was 
placed in a class taught by defendant Mary Angela Engelhardt.  
Engelhardt soon reported that E.J. exhibited a variety of 
disruptive behaviors, including not paying attention in class, 
fighting with other students, failing to remain seated, making 
continuous noises and repeatedly touching other children.  The 
teacher also observed that E.J. had difficulty beginning tasks, 
finishing those he did start and coloring within the lines.  In 
addition, throughout the school year E.J. urinated and defecated 
in his pants.  In October the school nurse, defendant Florence 
Noctor, told W.B. that other children were teasing E.J. because 
of his "bathrooming problem." Moreover, within the first few 
weeks of school, Engelhardt informed W.B. that E.J. might have 
Attention Deficit Disorder/Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder ("ADHD"), a condition with which W.B. was unfamiliar. 
 In October, W.B. met with Engelhardt and defendant Carol 
Burns, Chief School Administrator and the person responsible for 
compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. and § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act ("§ 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794.  The group 
discussed E.J.'s behavioral and academic problems, but no 
defendant referred E.J. for an evaluation or special education 
services, nor did anyone inform W.B. of E.J.'s possible 
entitlement to such services.  The same month E.J. began to see 
Dr. Lee Monday, a private therapist. 
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 After reading about ADHD later in the fall, W.B. raised it 
to Dr. Monday, who then diagnosed E.J. as having ADHD.  W.B. also 
spoke with Matula and Engelhardt and sent them literature about 
the disorder.  In December W.B. wrote them explaining that she 
believed E.J.'s behavioral and academic problems were 
attributable to ADHD and specifically requested that E.J. be 
permitted to spend additional time with the school's Resource 
Team. 
 The first actual dispute between the parties concerned 
evaluation.  W.B. asked the school to refer E.J. to the Mansfield 
Child Study Team ("CST") for evaluation;1 the school refused, but 
finally agreed after W.B. persuaded Matula, Engelhardt, Burns, 
and Catherine Brennan, director of the CST,2 to meet in February 
1992 with her, Dr. Monday, and a social worker whom Brennan had 
agreed to let observe E.J. in the classroom.  Brennan had 
believed that ADHD did not qualify a child for special services 
under IDEA or §504, but when W.B. showed her a memorandum from 
the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services to the contrary, Brennan relented and approved the 
CST evaluation. 
                     
1Among other duties, each CST in New Jersey is charged with the 
responsibility of identifying and diagnosing children needing 
special education services, developing public school programs for 
disabled children, and referring disabled children for 
residential, medical, or psychological treatment.  N.J.S.A § 
18A:46-5.  
2The duties of a CST supervisor "shall include the coordination 
of the special education services in the county."  N.J.S.A. 
§18A:46-3. 
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 In April 1992, the CST determined that E.J. had ADHD and was 
eligible for § 504 services. However, because E.J.'s academic 
performance was at or above grade level, the CST concluded he was 
not classifiable under IDEA and therefore not eligible for those 
services offered under IDEA but not the Rehabilitation Act.  The 
CST concluded: 
 [E.J.] has developed academic skills in the areas 
of reading, mathematics and written language that are 
at or above his current grade placement.  He is, 
therefore, not eligible for special education services 
. . . . However, the comprehensive Child Study Team 
evaluation does identify the presence of [ADHD] . . . . 
For this reason, [E.J.] is considered to be a 
handicapped person under Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
Appendix ("App.") at 98.  Though one examining physician on the 
CST recommended a speech evaluation, audiometry, and 
tympanometry, these suggestions were not included in the CST 
report.   
 Despite the CST finding that E.J. suffered from ADHD and was 
thus entitled to § 504 services, defendants did not begin 
providing them.  Concerned that the CST evaluation had not fully 
assessed E.J., W.B. asked defendants to fund an independent 
evaluation. Defendants refused. 
 In June 1992, W.B. initiated her first IDEA administrative 
proceeding before the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law 
("OAL"), seeking an independent evaluation of E.J., his 
classification as neurologically impaired (a status which would 
render him eligible for IDEA services), development of an 
Individual Education Plan ("IEP"), and costs and fees.  We will 
refer to this proceeding as "E.J. I."  In July 1992, on the date 
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of the E.J. I hearing, respondent Mansfield Board of Education 
("the Board" or "Mansfield") signed a consent order agreeing to 
an independent evaluation and adjourning the hearing on the 
balance of W.B.'s petition. 
 The independent evaluation took place soon thereafter. 
According to ALJ McGill, who heard the first and all subsequent 
petitions between W.B. and the Board, the evaluation 
was very significant because the determination was made 
for the first time that E.J. had Tourette's syndrome 
and a severe form of obsessive-compulsive disorder in 
addition to ADHD.  Thus, W.B. was substantially correct 
in her belief that the evaluation by the Mansfield CST 
did not properly identify E.J.'s problems. 
E.J. v. Mansfield, OAL Dkt Nos. EDS 11659-93/11798-93, Sept. 1, 
1994 ("E.J. IV"), at 49. 
 In September 1992 E.J. entered the second grade, joining a 
class taught by defendant Judy Beach, but his problems continued. 
Defendants were still not providing § 504 services.   
 As to classification, despite the findings of the 
independent evaluation, in November the CST concluded that E.J. 
was perceptually impaired but not neurologically impaired.  The 
distinction is important, because the former classification would 
result in a lower level of IDEA services for E.J. than the 
latter. W.B. attempted to persuade the school to reclassify her 
son as neurologically impaired, and in December 1992, Mansfield 
cross-petitioned to have E.J. classified as perceptually 
impaired.3 
                     
3W.B. filed three other petitions in January and February 1993, 
seeking to have Mansfield provide her with (1) a written daily 
log of E.J.'s behavior problems, (2) independent speech, 
occupational therapy, and educational evaluations, and (3) 
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 In April 1993, after nearly ten days of hearings, W.B. and 
the Board entered into a settlement stipulating that, as W.B. had 
sought, E.J. would be classified as neurologically impaired.  The 
stipulation also incorporated a thirty-page IEP that extended 
through the 1993-94 school year and provided for $14,000 for W.B. 
for attorneys fees and costs.  ALJ McGill approved the 
settlement, E.J. v. Mansfield Board of Education, OAL Dkt. Nos. 
5192-92/10038-92, April 12, 1993 ("E.J. I"), and later observed 
that "the settlement was consistent with the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence . . . . [I]t would appear that W.B. was 
substantially correct on the question of classification."  E.J. 
IV at 49-50. E.J. had nearly completed second grade. 
                                                                  
mediation to resolve her request that the Board fund E.J.'s 
private psychotherapy. Eventually W.B. prevailed in these 
requests too.  See discussion of E.J. IV, infra. 
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 More administrative proceedings followed,4 culminating in a 
final round of petitions filed in November and December 1993. 
These too were consolidated and referred to ALJ McGill, who held 
hearings for twenty-seven days, and on September 1, 1994 issued a 
fifty-four page opinion ordering the Board to (1) place E.J. in a 
private school at the Board's expense; (2) pay prospectively for 
E.J.'s sessions with the private therapist, Dr. Monday; (3) 
reimburse W.B. for the cost of an independent learning disability 
evaluation of E.J. which the Board had refused to provide; and 
(4) provide a supplemental occupational therapy evaluation.  E.J. 
IV at 54.  The ALJ McGill's final paragraph is instructive: 
 This decision would not be complete without a 
comment on Mansfield's seemingly endless attacks on the 
parent, W.B.  Evidently, Mansfield believes not only 
that W.B. is overly persistent, but also that she is 
                     
4
 Shortly after the E.J. I settlement, W.B. requested a few 
modifications to the IEP and then that E.J. be placed in a 
private school because the Board was unable to provide the free 
appropriate education to which E.J. was entitled.  The Board 
refused, two petitions followed, and they were consolidated 
before ALJ McGill. At the hearing, W.B. withdrew her request for 
private placement. The Board asked that the withdrawal be with 
prejudice or conditions, but ALJ McGill granted it without 
prejudice.  E.J. v. Mansfield Board of Education, OAL Dkt. Nos. 
EDS 6199-93/6302-93, August 6, 1993 ("E.J. II") at 9.  In August 
1993, the ALJ found further that there had been no change of 
circumstances since implementation of the IEP and dismissed 
W.B.'s petition to modify it.  Id. at 5, 8. 
 Before the decision in E.J. II was rendered, W.B. filed 
another petition alleging changed circumstances that necessitated 
E.J.'s placement in a private school.  This petition was referred 
to ALJ McGill, and on September 1, 1993 he denied it, reasoning 
that no changed circumstances warranted amending the IEP.  E.J. 
v. Mansfield Board of Education, OAL Dkt. No. EDS 7538-93 
(September 1, 1993) ("E.J. III").  W.B. appealed E.J. III to the 
district court in an action which was consolidated with the 
instant damages action.  W.B. and the Board eventually entered 
into a stipulation of dismissal regarding the E.J. III claims.  
See note 8, infra. 
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trying to wear down the district to obtain services to 
which E.J. is not entitled.  In my view, however, W.B. 
was essentially correct about the major points in 
dispute in these proceedings including evaluation, 
classification and placement.  Nonetheless, the 
district has consistently denied W.B.'s reasonable, 
appropriate, and meritorious requests related to E.J.'s 
education.  The basic dynamic of this entire dispute is 
that the district has denied W.B.'s meritorious 
requests and W.B. has been left with no alternative to 
an enormously burdensome struggle in order to obtain 
E.J.'s rights under IDEA.  In my view, the burden 
placed on W.B. was unnecessary, unwarranted and largely 
the product of the district's unwillingness to 
recognize and appreciate E.J.'s neurological 
impairments despite ample reliable evidence thereof. 
E.J. IV at 54.  According to plaintiffs, Mansfield has appealed 
E.J. IV to the district court.   
 The instant action 
 W.B. commenced this proceeding in July 1993, several months 
after the Board settled E.J. I by classifying E.J. as 
neurologically impaired and approving an IEP.  The complaint 
alleged causes of action directly under § 504; causes pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of procedural due process, the 
equal protection clause, and rights secured by IDEA, its 
regulations, § 504, and state statutes; causes pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1985; and causes directly under the New Jersey 
Constitution and statutes.  W.B. sought compensatory and punitive 
damages for defendants' failure to provide E.J. a free, 
appropriate public education.   
 The district court consolidated the action with W.B.'s 
appeal of E.J. III.  After the parties consented or stipulated to 
the dismissal of a number of defendants, those remaining in the 
case were Matula, the principal; Engelhardt, E.J.'s first grade 
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teacher; Beach, his second grade teacher; Brennan, director of 
the CST; Burns, the school administrator; and Noctor, the school 
nurse, as well as Dr. Gary Danielson, the school psychologist and 
a member of the CST; Patricia Cericola, a speech and language 
therapist and member of the CST; and Ann Pearce, a 
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